Framing a coalition for 2026

There is a whole lot of talk about the need for a coalition in 2026, that is an excellent proposal. If for no other reason, we need unity of purpose to end the nightmare that the average Gambian family lives through daily. But the critical question remains, what foundation should such a coalition be built on?

We know there has been multiple attempts in the past to bring opposition parties together to oust Jammeh without success until 2016. Even though it survived long enough to achieve its primary goal of ousting Jammeh, the coalition was short-lived and disintegrated shortly after their win.

What lessons should be learnt from that? How can future efforts be designed to avoid such scenarios? These are the issues that we seek to address in this piece with specific attention to the United Democratic Party’s long held position that a party-led alliance is the best approach.

After reaching what became known as a “gentleman’s agreement” the various political parties and Independent candidate for the 2016 election laid out an agenda for the change they seek should they succeed. Suffice to say besides removing Jammeh, most other proposals were never implemented beyond the preliminary stage.

Credited as the main architect of that coalition arrangement, Hon. Halifa Sallah and his PDOIS colleagues excused themselves from assuming any role in the new executive and sought to offer their services through the National Assembly as a matter of party principle.

To many, that undermined faith in the unity within the coalition, but their position was respected and understood. As members of the executive, they would serve at the pleasure of the president who is the head of the executive, and they did not want to subject themselves to the whims of the president who could fire them at will. Which became the fate of most of the coalition partners, so by that token, they made the right call.

Here is the issue. Upon his swearing-in, Adama Barrow assumed executive powers as per the 1997 constitution to wield as he saw fit. The proposals for a “Think Tank” and consultations with coalition partners on appointments to critical roles were never realized. But critically also, they were not constitutional requirements for him to abide by, in fact they contradicted the constitutional provisions on how the president should exercise his power. Even though political expediency was his main motivator rather than constitutionality, that is noteworthy.

The same will be true for any future president. They will assume office with powers enshrined in the current constitution which still is the 1997 constitution. It would be at least a few months before a new constitution could be adopted subject to parliamentary process and a referendum.

With that in mind, if a new coalition is called and formatted in the same fashion as the 2016 coalition, what constitutional mechanism does any coalition partner have to hold the winner to account should he or she renege on any of the promises made to them?

We all saw what the calculation was for Barrow and how his backers were left helpless following his betrayal of the “gentleman’s agreement.”

One could argue that he was encouraged along that path by UDP, fair enough. But let us proceed along the path of personal responsibility and the reality of politics and power dynamics. Barrow’s calculations were entirely political in nature, as they still are, and it is all focused on how to retain power.

Former allies either had to surrender to his will, like Hamat Bah and his NRP did, like Mai Fatty and his GMC, Henry Gomez and GPDP, NCP under Majanko Samusa etc. Those who refuse to buckle were kicked to the curb and replaced by former rivals. In his infamous “bus” analogy, Barrow explicitly stated as much. “You are either in [unquestioned loyalty] or out.”

All the capitulation and groveling at Barrow’s feet by his backers was for no other reason than to get a piece of the cake for themselves. None of the subsequent alliances were forged along policy lines or with tangible results for the population in mind. It was a case of “what would be my reward for bringing my party base to you?”

Hamat Bah kept his ministerial position, Henry Gomez was made adviser (minister without portfolio), Fabakary Tombong Jatta brought APRC and got the speakership for himself, deputy speakership for his APRC colleague Seedy Njie as well as diplomatic appointments for other prominent APRC figures. PPP got Papa Njie off to diplomatic duties. All of them individual rewards earned through the goodwill of the president who demands full surrender and loyalty to his desires. Nothing for the country and the citizens who hoped for much.

The Coalition 2016 was entirely dependent on the president honoring his word. There were no control mechanisms, no checks, and no redress in law. The result as we subsequently saw, was parties showing fealty to the president in exchange for favors doled out in the form of appointments to coveted positions.

But promises of personal rewards in exchange for support is not the only way to build political alliances. The alternative could be a coalition proposal based on policy convergence. A coalition based on what benefits the people most regardless of who gets to assume the presidency. It is doable if we put personal grievances, grudges, and egos aside.

This could be the foundation upon which a party-led alliance could be built. Rather than seek personal rewards in the form of ministerial or ambassadorial posts, support the bid of the party most likely to win with conditions attached. Conditions that are specific, could be monitored, and their success or failure measured on how they impact lives. Partners can demand their implementation be within a specified timeframe. But more importantly, put mechanisms in place to ensure the party that gets your backing would not have absolute authority to do as they please in an all-out partisan power grab by demanding a power sharing mechanism through the National Assembly that could serve as an effective check on the executive.

Here are a few general examples that every party can get on board with as terms.

• A new constitution: Demand a return of the 2020 Draft to the National Assembly for debate, ratification, and then sent to a referendum. Demand this be done immediately after swearing-in.
• Repeal the Public Order Act: As we know, the 2020 Draft already includes that provision, but can be emphasized as well.
• Accountability: Implement the recommendations of the various commissions set up from 2017 to date. Their recommendations are expert drawn recommendations and not a witch hunt. The recommendations of the Janneh Commission, the TRRC, the SSR etc. If needed, they can be re-evaluated by experts that all parties approve of. A new commission to investigate the current administration with specific attention to the audit reports can also be demanded.
• Non-partisan appointments: Demand that the National Assembly be empowered to vet and confirm appointments to certain key positions with security of tenure to avoid political interference in their roles such as the role of IGP (also catered to by a provision in the 2020 Draft).
• Power sharing: The party that will be backed to head the executive must not seek to have a super majority in the National Assembly thereby allowing the coalition partners some degree of control over what they do, such as confirming appointments to make sure they are not entirely partisan, but merit based as well.

Each party could have specific policy demands to use as bargaining chips, the above list is not exhaustive but if we truly want what best serves The Gambian people, we can demand alliances around specific policy agendas and design power structures in such a way that the executive, which would be composed mainly of one party, does not have free reign to do as they please because the other parties together have a bigger majority in the National Assembly where they control the budget, have oversight, and can offset any attempts by the executive to consolidate power.

This gesture would serve as a compromise position, and much goodwill would come from it. The party that gets backed would not see any imminent threat to their power by being suspicious of cabinet members forced on them through a coalition arrangement as hatching internal schemes to undermine them. The coalition partners would not feel helpless either as they have a degree of control in who gets confirmed for key positions in government.

Then comes the big question, which party should lead such a coalition?

From its formation in 1996, the UDP consistently polled over 25% of the votes cast in presidential elections, except in 2011 when they protested the elections, even then they came out with 17%, a very wide gap between them and the second runner-up. This percentage does not only represent the number of marbles in a drum, but they also represent real live Gambians who cast their votes for UDP because it is the party that appealed to them. One may not agree with the party’s views on issues or even like the personalities within the party, but they represent more than a quarter of the population and discounting that base is being dismissive of fellow Gambians who deserve a voice.

Let us assume for once that the Gambia has a second round of voting where the winner needed a clear 50+1 majority, the only other party that would face off with the incumbent in the second round consistently since 1996, would be UDP. The other parties would either have to endorse UDP or APRC/NPP or withhold their endorsement. This is what the “big party” argument is based on; a large support base larger than that of the other opposition parties.

By all political indications, UDP is the party best positioned to win against the incumbent. Yes, they may not be able to do it alone, but it is equally true that without their support, no alliance will be strong enough to do it either.

If an arrangement could be hatched, where they are allowed to lead but forced to share power in a format similar to the one highlighted above, with Halifa and Sidia leading the coequal branch of the National Assembly as they prefer to, what do we have to lose, really?

Yes, there are other key players in the political field, but if these two entities that have been a consistent presence on our political stage with a proven track record of dedication, patriotism, committed support, and selflessness can lead the effort, the others would have no choice but to join their efforts.

We can either recognize the fragility of political alliances and seek to remedy flaws from 2016, or dwell on past grievances and refuse to reconcile differences to move forward.